Scottish Political News |  |
A blog aggregator for Scottish Political News |
Sep 30 2007
Sep 30 2007
Sep 30 2007
Sep 30 2007
There has been a phrase in the national press and among political commentators that I have noticed more and more over the last year or so. I wouldn't go as far as to say it annoys me but it certainly irks. Generally preceding a female politician, the phrase in question is "the fragrant......".
Even bloggers have picked up on it and are seemingly using it with reckless abandon. Examples include:
Ridiculous politicsSep 30 2007
Sep 29 2007
Sep 29 2007
Sep 28 2007
Sep 28 2007
The rumour mill at parliament went into overdrive when Labour moved their central support unit from an office that is quite visible in the parliament’s garden lobby to a more secluded office – Alexander was none to pleased about the reports of her shouting at researchers.Sep 28 2007
Many sources are reporting this as an Independence referendum but from what I understand this is not quite the case. Instead the referendum is for the people of the Basque country to vote on whether they believe its their right to determine their own constitutional future – in a nutshell do the people believe they are sovereign. An independence referendum for the Basque Country would then be for a later date.Sep 28 2007
Sep 28 2007
Sep 28 2007
Sep 28 2007
I’ve been following the Dan Rather saga ever since my news intake of the 2004 US elections was rudely interrupted by this weird thingy called blog opinion. I followed it so much that I even did a dissertation on what has since become known as Rathergate and followed that up with an exclusive interview with the instigator of it all, the incomparable Harry MacDougald (click on the link on the right or here)
When I started on this journey I felt a considerable lack of sympathy for Dan Rather . . . Of course he was duped by a weirdo with an agenda but he was the USA’s top-dog journalist, the man not just with the questions but often with the answers, if Dan said something then the US believed it. Of course his producer Mary Mapes and her assistants didn’t help but, as many have pointed out, Dan should have questioned the memos. He should at the very least have been suspicious. He shoulda twigged. Alas, the problem with Rathergate wasn’t that Bill Burkin’s fake documents were just too good not to print, it was that the wily Burkin made them fit the profile exactly of what an exclusive-hungry CBS anchorman would want.
Following last week’s news that Dan is now resurrecting the whole sorry saga in a $70m lawsuit against his former employer, I now feel real sadness. Even if he wins (does he need the dough?) it will be Pyrrhic.
According to the above-linked NYTimes article Dan says:
“I’d like to know what really happened”, he said, his eyes red and watering. “Let’s get under oath. Let’s get e-mails. Let’s get who said what to whom, when and for what purpose.”
Who said what to whom? Dude, all anyone interested in Rathergate needs to do is click here, it’s all there in black and white . . . just like those memos.
It’s sad that after 3 years Dan hasn’t realised that.
Sep 27 2007
The following is my take on the recent elections in Greece. It will be also appearing on Emancipation and Liberation soon, but I thought I'd post it here as well, because I know you were waiting for it.
That the Greek parliamentary election of the 16th of September would result in a significantly different composition of the legislature than the one Greeks are used to was more or less common knowledge. Three and a half years of extreme government incompetence and quite shocking scandals such as the telephone surveillance case[1] and the abduction of Pakistani men by British agents[2], both having serious implications on national sovereignty, as well as increasing incidents of police brutality, especially during the student protests against the proposed educational reform (on which I'll comment in another post), ensured that support for the conservative government of Nea Demokratia (ND, New Democracy), would retreat significantly from the 45.36% of the vote tallied in 2004 and the strong absolute majority of 165 out 300 parliamentary seats this guaranteed. Moreover, the fact that the whole of the rather short campaigning period took place under the shadow, or better, under the eerie glare of a rather large part of the country being ravaged by wild fires which were anything by accidental, made certain that there would be a significant protest vote gained by the far left and, to a lesser extent, the far right.
Both of the above happened more or less as expected, with ND suffering a loss of 3.52% and 13 seats, tallying 2,995,321 votes (41.83%), which significantly decreased their parliamentary power, leaving them with a very slight majority of only 152 seats. Meanwhile, the combined far left vote increased by 4.04% to 13.19%. KKE (the Communist Party) gathered an impressive 8.15% (+2.26) of the vote returning 22 MPs (+10), while SYRIZA (Coalition of the Radical Left), with 5.04% (+1.78) returned 14 MPs (+8). In large cities, the gains made by the left were significantly higher, with, for example, KKE reaching 14.55% in the V' Peiraios district and SYRIZA 9.27% in A' Athinon. On the opposite end of the spectrum, the far right
What was more surprising is the serious setback suffered by PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement, the Greek equivalent of the Labour party). Support for the SPD-style Social Democrats retreated below the level of the 2004 election to 38.10 % (102 MPs, -2.45%), the lowest in more than 20 years[3].
The emerging picture is that of a clear shift of popular support away from the two large bourgeois parties towards radical smaller forces. Whether this is just an isolated protest vote incidence or the beginning of a more long term trend pointing to an intensification of class struggle remains to be seen. What is certain however is that Greek society has become far more receptive to more radical politics meaning that an increasing amount of space will be opening up for the far left to organise in the near future. Before going into what the immediate tasks of the Greek left are, it would be useful to provide some background on the parties currently in Parliament which it would be fair to say, will be the prime forces shaping Greek politics in the next four years (unless of course a revolution happens, workers councils spontaneously spring up and the dictatorship of the proletariat is established, but I wouldn't be getting my hopes up for that).
The Parties
Nea Demokratia
Nea Demokratia was founded by Konstadinos Karamanlis, the first post-dictatorship Prime Minister of Greece. It is the traditional party of Greek capital and its satellite strata. While international commentators generally refer to them as conservatives, a more correct parallel would be continental European Christian Democracy. Unlike most centre-right parties, it is not a group of right wing liberals, but on the contrary, includes a variety of rightists from David Cameron like "modern" fluffy conservatives, to intensely ideological, ultra religious xenophobic cavemen like the former Minister of Public Order, who used to refer to riot police as the “praetorian guard of the country”. The Party is currently led by Kostas Karamanlis, the founder's nephew who seems to have been placed at the helm more for his name than his political skills.
Right after emerging victorious, Karamanlis restructured the government, removing extremely unpopular ministers like the aforementioned Public Order brute from their posts (in fact, the Public Order ministry was abolished as an independent body and was incorporated into the Ministry of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation), in an obvious effort to rebuild the party's citizen friendly image. However, this does not in any way mean that there will be any large scale retreat from the aggressive neo-liberal policies ND has been pursuing against the exploited working strata of Greek society with the tacit support of PASOK. Nevertheless, its significantly weakened position in Parliament is bound to make the party far more responsive to social movement pressure.
PASOK
Above, I described PASOK as SPD-style social-democrats. The reason I did so is that, like the SPD, PASOK has been on an increasingly right wing trajectory without however having been transformed (yet) into a fully fledged neo-Thatcherite party like New Labour. The similarities however, end here. Unlike both Labour and SPD, PASOK did not arise organically out of the struggle of the working class, it did not emerge as the political wing of the trade union movement and was definitely never a radical socialist political force. That is not to say that, it is not, like Labour, the party were most of the working class is, but that its apparatus is not composed by cadres of a proletarian character.
The party, or movement as they style themselves, was founded following the collapse of the Colonel Dictatorship in late 1974 by Andreas Papandreou, son of the prominent classical liberal politician Georgios Papandreou. From the very beginning, the social basis of PASOK lay in the radical wings of the petty and national bourgeoisie. Its early policy platform was clearly populist left nationalist, and in that manner, they share a lot with the SNP, although
The current leader of the "movement" is Giorgos Papandreou, son of the founder, who acceded to the presidency shortly before the 2004 elections, in an effort to rebuild party popularity after 8 years of neo-liberal "modernisation" under Costas Simitis had severely eroded its support basis. Despite employing populist rhetoric and conjuring his father's ghost on every opportunity, Papandreou has failed to stop PASOK's bleeding of support to the left. After defeat in the latest elections had become evident, he announced that he would be seeking reelection as president, however, shortly after that, Evagelos Venizelos, who while popular within PASOK, is considered to be on the conservative wing of the party, also announced his candidacy. Elections are to be held sometime in November. I will return to their significance for the left later.
While there is definitely a difference between what LAOS as a party puts forward and what its members actually believe (LAOS includes former members of extreme right organisations that have often been involved in violent attacks against immigrants and left activists), it should be remembered that small parties can only have a political effect on society through the issues they raise and the arguments they put forward, rather than what they actually practice, simply because they are not in a position to actually do anything of any importance. The situation might have been more problematic if
What is more, the percentage of the electorate that was attracted to
KKE
The Communist Party is the oldest party in
Despite these major setbacks, KKE managed to rebuild itself and its youth, becoming the largest far left political force, with more than 10,000 members. Its success is largely based on its insistence on explicitly class based politics, its focus on staunch opposition to all imperialist projects, both NATO and EU inspired as well as its diligent participation in all workers' struggles.
On the downside, KKE is extremely bureaucratic, leaving little, if any room for initiative to its grassroots activists. It is extremely sectarian, refusing to cooperate with other left wing groups and parties despite the fact that it could use its political muscle to become the driving force behind left regroupment in
SYRIZA
The Coalition of the Radical Left, is, as its name implies, not an actual party but an electoral coalition. It is quite peculiar however in that it is not composed of groups of roughly equal political weight, but is instead dominated by one party, Synaspismos, or Syn, around which a few marginal organisations have grouped. These are: the Communist Organisation of Greece (Maoist), International Workers' Left (a split from the Greek SWP), Red (a split from the latter), Movement for the United Action of the Left, Active Citizens, Ecological Intervention, Renewing Ecological Communist Left, Popular Unions of Bipartisan Left Groups, and the Democratic Social Movement. Apart from the latter, it would be fair to say that no one, other than left wing activists, has ever heard of these groups. It is thus very unlikely that anyone, apart from their members, intended to vote SYRIZA in order to support them. It would be safe therefore to regard the growth of support for SYRIZA as a coalition, as a growth of support of Synaspismos as a party. In fact, "Synaspismos" is Greek for "coalition", suggesting that many of SYRIZA's voters are not aware of the distinction between the party and the coalition. Thus, the politics of Syn form the core of all SYRIZA policies, even if the smaller groups maintain some influence on their content.
Synaspismos itself was formed in the early 90s after the aforementioned expulsions from the Communist Party. The expelled members joined up with the Eurocommunists that had split from the party in the late 60s. As is the case with most Eurocommunist and reformed CP formations, Synaspismos's social basis was far less proletarian in composition, with the party being strongest amongst the more privileged strata of the working class as well as the radicalised elements of the middle classes. Naturally then, Synaspismos conducts its politics with little, if any reference to class as the fundamental cleavage in society, while socialism is rarely mentioned as the party's ultimate political goal, with abstract references to a "more just society" being made instead. This movementist, RESPECT like approach is entirely in line with Syn's leadership plan to construct a broad, left of PASOK alliance, as in opposed to an explicitly socialist political force. While there's is an argument (correct or wrong) to be made for such a strategy in countries like England, on the basis that the political level of the working class is not high enough to allow the growth of a radical class-based socialist party, in the context of a society that is obviously receptive to open class politics as is shown by the growth of KKE, this is nothing sort of reactionary.
In its defense, Syn has a far healthier internal political structure/culture than that of the KKE, which, allowing the formation of platforms is fairly similar to that of the SSP. However, the ideological cohesion of Syn is far weaker than the SSP's even before the split. The SSP suffered from including socialists with very contradictory ideas of how socialists should conduct their struggle, but the idea of socialism as a society that is a complete negation of capitalism was never disputed. Syn on the other hand includes in its ranks anyone from orthodox Marxists to radical social-democrats. This is a rather insoluble contradiction that has often led to embarrassing incidents of Syn members from different factions opposing each other on tv panels.
I hope that the above has given the reader a more or less solid idea of the nature of the prime political parties in Greece; we can now proceed to examine the prospects opened up for the left by the electoral result.
Prospects and Tasks
While both the retreat of the main bourgeois parties and the growth of the radical left were substantial, it is important to remember that they were not nearly as great as the scale of the destruction wrought by the summer fires should have caused them to be. This is not the place to discuss how bourgeois hegemony maintains itself even in the most adverse circumstances. It is important however to realise that if the left does not remain persistent in its resolute opposition to neo-liberal offensives, as well as organise effective resistance against them, this breakthrough might very well be for naught. While a collapse of the scale of the SSP vote is extremely unlikely, simply for reasons of historic loyalty to KKE of a sizable portion of the left, a retreat to the levels of 2004 would still be very disappointing.
In the immediate future, there will be a number of issues that will require swift action to be taken by both KKE and Syn-SYRIZA. Firstly, the attitude of the government towards the communities destroyed by the fires will surely cause much disillusionment and aid will most definitely be insufficient, inefficient and tokenistic. Further, it is certain that a large part of the burned areas will be given to land developers to build on. Infact, this has already started in some areas. There will definitely be significant local opposition to this and it is imperative for both left poles to be visibly present. Unfortunately, given the rural nature of said areas and their long conservative tradition, it is unlikely that a strong left current will be established there. It is however important that the left is present, if only to help raise its national profile, as the destruction of the Peloponese is regarded as a serious matter by the whole of Greek society.
Second, after having restructured itself, the government of Karamanlis will surely embark on an offensive of "modernising" reforms that will be directed against the working class. The one that is bound to have the highest profile, at least in the immediate future, is the proposed revision of the constitution to amend article 16, guaranteeing the public and universal character of education in the country. The student movement that shook Greece last year, although bound to be significantly demobilised and weakened after a whole summer of catch up classes and exam periods, will surely be brought to the forth once again. While the movement suffered from the lack of a correct political orientation, being basically led by corrupt elements of the student union and professor bureaucracy, which saw the "framework-law" reforms - which has since been passed - as an attack against their privileges (which they were), there is little doubt as to the need to fight against the proposed constitutional revision, which would almost certainly destroy what little quality public education in Greece has. The student movement therefore will offer a good chance for the left to build and organise.
Finally, the succession struggle in PASOK will inevitably cause much upheaval within the working masses that still support them. If the populist Panadreou was unable to stop PASOK's bleeding of support despite his overtures to the left, then Venizelos, the likely winner of the contest, who is a far more thoroughly bourgeois politician will only increase the rate of decline. It is thus more likely that PASOK will soon start to fight ND on its own ground. Bizarrely, this might actually work for them, as ND will most likely move to the right on token issues as pressure from
Conclusion: The problem of left bipolarity and the KKE or Syn dilemma
As long as this division within the radical left persists, any resistance against the increasing aggressiveness of the bourgeoisie will be severely fettered by sectarianism, while any hope of it turning into an actual working class offensive will remain just that, a hope. While it is true that responsibility for kicking off the project of meaningful left unity lies with KKE as both the larger and the more radical force of the two (and unfortunately, the most sectarian of all), Syn-SYRIZA should be criticised on the basis that it does not engage in any action that might make the KKE Central Committee more open towards the prospect of rapprochement. Specifically, Syn's complete lack of principled opposition to the European Union's directives (in fact, the nature of its opposition amounts to critical support), must be abandoned in favour of a more clear cut rejection of the whole project like its position on NATO. Further, the radical wing of Syn should try to pull the party towards a more class oriented approach to politics, away from its current new left movementism, which is a sure recipe for dilution of principles. It is Syn that must provide the initiative for left regroupment on a radical socialist basis, even in the form of an electoral pact, as any such move is unlikely to come from KKE.
This situation creates an almost insoluble dilemma for non aligned Greek leftists. Electorally, one has to choose between a mass party with explicit class, socialist politics which is however totally bureaucratic and sectarian, and a smaller loose coalition of vaguely radical left forces without a clear political orientation which could in the future possibly enter a bourgeois coalition. There is no easy solution to this problem and one has to choose based as much on personal convictions and feelings as on objective political analysis. Those of us who follow the Greek left without being actively involved in it, can only hope that the self-activity of the working masses will at some point force their vanguard groups to get their act together.
[1] For a fairly good piece on this, see the wikipedia entry: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_telephone_tapping_case_2004-2005
[2] Greek society was in the dark about this, until it was uncovered by the BBC. See here: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4526502.stm
[3] See the Ministry of Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation website for an analytical breakdown of electoral results. http://www.ekloges.ypes.gr/pages_en/index.html
[4]The content of the motion can be found here: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+MOTION+B6-2005-0079+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN
[5] Interview of Alekos Alavanos on NET (in Greek): http://www.syn.gr/gr/keimeno.php?id=7563
Sep 27 2007
"The Labour Government has a mandate to govern that extends until the spring of 2010! Under the rules of this parliamentary democracy Gordon Brown needs no personal mandate of his own; the mandate belongs to his party. So the only conceivable reason for calling an election is to gain an electoral advantage - on the basis of polling predictions. This will be transparent to voters. What credible public justification could be offered for so unnecessarily premature a move?I think most people agree that the idea of governments having a mandate to carry out a raft of policies is a myth that doesn't bear too careful examination. But it shouldn't be dismissed completely, I think, for a couple of reasons.
If Brown does go ahead and call an election and it doesn't pay off, then he and his party will look - deservedly - sick. If it pays off, then it pays off. But it will do no credit to Brown, the Labour Party or British parliamentary democracy."
Sep 27 2007
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Sep 26 2007
And remember, they've sworn to use it against Israel as soon as they get it.He really did say that. Watch it if you don't believe me.
Yeah.Paxman, he is not.
"'When the dear Imam [Khomeini] said that [the Shah's] regime must go, and that we demand a world without dependent governments, many people who claimed to have political and other knowledge [asked], 'Is it possible [that the Shah’s regime can be toppled]?'Ahmadinejad is undoubtedly vehemently opposed to the existence of the state of Israel in its current form. The often overlooked point is that he was talking about bringing about the end of the "regime", not about physically wiping a country of the map.
"'That day, when Imam [Khomeini] began his movement, all the powers supported [the Shah's] corrupt regime… and said it was not possible. However, our nation stood firm, and by now we have, for 27 years, been living without a government dependent on America. Imam [Khomeni] said: 'The rule of the East [U.S.S.R.] and of the West [U.S.] should be ended.' But the weak people who saw only the tiny world near them did not believe it.
"'Nobody believed that we would one day witness the collapse of the Eastern Imperialism [i.e. the U.S.S.R], and said it was an iron regime. But in our short lifetime we have witnessed how this regime collapsed in such a way that we must look for it in libraries, and we can find no literature about it.
"'Imam [Khomeini] said that Saddam [Hussein] must go, and that he would be humiliated in a way that was unprecedented. And what do you see today? A man who, 10 years ago, spoke as proudly as if he would live for eternity is today chained by the feet, and is now being tried in his own country...
"'Imam [Khomeini] said: 'This regime that is occupying Qods [Jerusalem] must be eliminated from the pages of history.' This sentence is very wise. The issue of Palestine is not an issue on which we can compromise.
Sep 26 2007
Gawking at celebs is a national pastime in London. An occasional series updated whenever I spot a celebrity in London and If I ever get a phone from this millenium then I’ll post pics here too . . . unless of course the 3AM girls demand an exclusive.
Chris Eubank, 24th August 2007:
Driving down Brook street past Claridges in his huge juggernaut cab tooting his horn and grinning at everyone who looked up. This is the second time I’ve seen this behemoth . . . does he drive it because it’s unclampable? Anyway, Chris parked up (quite expertly considering) got out and had his pic taken with a few people before climbing back in and driving off down Bond Street. The purpose of this fleeting visit? Haven’t a scooby . . . . . suggestions please. I could still hear the horn in the distance twenty minutes later. Must be tough driving that thing in and out of Brighton.
Michael Palin, 25th September 2007:
Walking along the south Bank heading north to the Waterloo bridge steps over the BFI. The former Python and now professional globetrottoer had that unkempt-but-fashionable look that celebs seem to do so well.
Sep 26 2007
Sep 25 2007
"A wise ruler ought never to keep faith when by doing so it would be against his interests." Niccolo Machiavelli
